Statuspage

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 5:07 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.2

Overview

The skill is mostly a coherent Statuspage connector, but its setup instructions tell users to execute a remote installer directly, which creates avoidable supply-chain risk.

Review this skill before installing. The Statuspage actions are clearly listed and destructive actions require confirmation, but do not blindly run the remote installer commands; prefer official installation documentation, pinned packages, and checksum or signature verification. Also confirm exact payloads before creating, updating, or deleting Statuspage resources.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:67
• Finding: Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 67–71 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis Both installation commands retrieve mutable scripts from an external server and immediately execute them through a command interpreter. The instructions do not pin an installer version, validate a cryptographic checksum or signature, preserve the script for inspection, or otherwise constrain what code can execute. TLS protects the connection to the server under normal conditions, but it does not guarantee that the served script is safe or unchanged after this Skill has been audited. Compromise of the OOMOL website, its deployment pipeline, DNS, hosting infrastructure, or certificate issuance could cause arbitrary attacker-controlled commands to be delivered. Installing the CLI is only relevant when `oo` is unavailable and is not required for routine Statuspage operations. Automatically executing an installer therefore exceeds the minimum privileges needed to invoke the declared connector actions. The audit did not establish that the current remote installers are malicious; the vulnerability is the uncontrolled, mutable remote execution channel. ### Attack Path 1. The user or agent attempts to invoke the Skill when the `oo` CLI is absent. 2. The command fails with `oo: command not found`. 3. The Skill directs the user or agent to run one of the documented installation commands. 4. The command downloads the current installer from `cli.oomol.com`. 5. `bash` or PowerShell `Invoke-Expression` executes the response immediately without integrity verification or inspection. 6. If the remote delivery chain has been compromised, attacker-controlled code executes with the privileges ...[truncated 629 chars]
• Remediation: ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove the `curl | bash` and `Invoke-Expression` installation patterns. - Prefer a trusted operating-system package manager with a pinned package version and authenticated repository metadata. - If direct downloads are necessary, pin a specific immutable installer release rather than a mutable `install.sh` or `install.ps1` endpoint. - Download the installer to disk without executing it, then verify a cryptographic signature or SHA-256 checksum published through an independent trusted channel. - Allow the user to inspect the verified installer and require explicit approval before execution. - Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a documented installation step strictly requires elevation. - Keep installation outside the normal Skill execution flow. On a missing-CLI error, provide safe manual setup documentation rather than executing a remote installer automatically.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs the agent/user to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This creates a supply-chain and remote code execution risk: if the host, transport, distribution pipeline, or script contents are compromised, arbitrary commands would run immediately with the user's privileges. In a skill context, this is more dangerous because the document operationalizes the step as a fallback action during normal task execution, increasing the chance an agent may trigger it automatically.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.