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Security audit

Skio

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Skio read connector, but its first-time setup tells the agent/user to run unverified remote install scripts directly in a shell.

Install only if you are comfortable with OOMOL and Skio account access, and avoid running the pipe-to-shell installer blindly. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a verified package or official instructions with checksum/signature validation before using the connector.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:58
Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Downloaded and Executed Directly## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58–62 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions pipe remotely downloaded installation scripts directly into command interpreters. The effective code is hosted outside the reviewed project and can change after this skill has been audited. Neither command pins a script version nor verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution. HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, but it does not protect against compromise of the vendor domain, hosting infrastructure, DNS or certificate controls, installation endpoint, or release pipeline. If any such component is compromised, arbitrary replacement content would be executed immediately. The use of `curl -fsSL` also suppresses normal output and follows redirects, reducing the user's opportunity to review the final source and content. The installation behavior is conditional on the `oo` command being unavailable and uses a vendor-associated `oomol.com` domain. No evidence establishes that the current scripts are compromised. Nevertheless, direct execution of mutable remote content creates a substantial supply-chain execution risk and exceeds the privileges needed merely to describe or invoke the Skio connector. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent attempts to use the skill on a system where the `oo` CLI is unavailable. 2. The documented fallback directs the user to execute one of the remote installation commands. 3. An attacker compromises or gains control over the installation endpoint, its delivery infrastructure, or an allowed redirect destination. 4. The endpoint returns an attacker-control ...[truncated 1149 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the pipe-to-shell and `Invoke-Expression` installation patterns. 2. Direct users to a version-pinned package or release artifact from an authenticated release channel. 3. Download the artifact to disk without executing it, then verify a published cryptographic signature or a checksum obtained through an independently trusted channel. 4. Allow the user to inspect the downloaded script or package before execution. 5. Pin the expected release version and document its exact digest so the reviewed payload cannot change silently. 6. Require explicit user approval before installing software or running any downloaded installer. 7. Run installation with ordinary user privileges whenever possible and clearly identify any operation that requires elevation. 8. Prefer a platform package manager with signed metadata and package verification where supported. 9. If installation scripts must remain available, publish immutable versioned URLs, enforce same-origin redirects, sign each release, and provide separate download, verification, and execution commands.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This is dangerous because it executes unverified code from the network with the user's privileges, and any compromise of the host, CDN, DNS, TLS interception, or upstream script contents could lead to arbitrary code execution on the machine running the skill.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.