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Security audit

Shodan

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly aligned with Shodan lookup use, but its setup instructions ask users to run unverified remote installer scripts directly in a shell.

Install only if you are comfortable trusting OOMOL's installer endpoint, or use a safer oo CLI installation path such as a reviewed, version-pinned package with checksum or signature verification. After setup, the skill appears intended for Shodan read/search actions through OOMOL-managed credentials.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:61
Finding

Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Executed Directly by Shell

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 61–65
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

bash
curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
powershell
irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex           # Windows PowerShell

Technical Analysis

The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from an external server and immediately execute them in Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins a release version nor verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution. Consequently, the effective code executed by a user can differ from the content available when this Skill was audited.

Installing the oo CLI is relevant to the declared Shodan connector functionality, but immediate pipe-to-shell execution is not the minimum privilege or safest mechanism necessary to perform that installation. The reviewed Skill limits its declared tool access to Bash(oo *); however, these setup instructions ask the user to invoke unrestricted shell interpreters outside that narrow operational scope.

No evidence in the reviewed project establishes that the remote scripts are presently malicious. The vulnerability is that trust is delegated to mutable remote content without integrity validation, creating a supply-chain code-execution path.

Attack Path

  1. The oo command is unavailable, causing the user or agent to consult the first-time setup instructions.
  2. An attacker compromises the installation server, its deployment account, the hosted script, or another part of the content-delivery path.
  3. The attacker modifies install.sh or install.ps1 to include arbitrary commands.
  4. The user runs the documented command.
  5. curl or irm retrieves the modified payload.
  6. Bash or PowerShell executes it immediately, without an intermediate inspection or integrity-verification step.
  7. T ...[truncated 783 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove direct curl | bash and irm | iex installation patterns.
  • Direct users to a trusted package manager or a version-pinned release artifact from the official repository.
  • Separate download from execution so the retrieved file can be inspected before it runs.
  • Publish a SHA-256 digest and a cryptographic signature through an independently protected channel, and require both to be verified.
  • Pin the installer or binary to a specific immutable version rather than a mutable generic installation URL.
  • Require explicit user approval before executing any installer.
  • Run installation with ordinary user privileges whenever possible; do not request elevation unless a documented installation step strictly requires it.
  • For PowerShell, download the script to a local file, validate its Authenticode or other trusted signature and expected digest, and only then execute it.
  • Keep routine Skill execution restricted to the declared oo command scope after installation.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to execute a remote installer via curl ... | bash, which runs network-fetched code without prior integrity verification or review. If the install endpoint, transport, DNS, or hosting account is compromised, this can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description says to use this skill for "ANY Shodan request" and "Whenever a task involves Shodan," which is an expansive activation condition without clear boundaries or exclusions. In a manifest file, this can cause unintended invocation for loosely related mentions of Shodan rather than clearly scoped actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.