Back to skill

Security audit

Seedance

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Seedance workflow requires approval for changes, but its setup can execute unchecked downloaded code and introduce broader agent-environment changes.

Review and approve the CLI installation separately, including whether it may install or synchronize additional agent skills. OOMOL mediates your Seedance requests, so consider the data and account access you grant it. The downloaded installers and hosted connector implementation were unavailable for inspection; their complete behavior remains unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote script execution for an Oomol installer rather than the declared Seedance data operations. Dependency installation can be a supporting implementation detail, but the supplied material establishes no relationship between this installer and Seedance. The downloaded script's contents are unavailable, so its further effects cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a live HTTPS response directly into bash executes mutable remote code without reviewing or authenticating the installer artifact. A compromised vendor endpoint or distribution pipeline could run arbitrary commands with the invoking user's privileges; the legitimate CLI dependency and conditional fallback reduce exposure but do not remove this supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

The setup fallback executes a downloaded installer without warning the user about remote code execution or system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs installation through downloaded shell or PowerShell code without explicit user approval for host changes or any integrity verification. Although it is limited to a missing prerequisite and uses the documented vendor domain, executing an installer can alter the host with the invoking user's privileges; this overlaps with SC2 rather than constituting a separate exploit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources