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Security audit

Scrapingdog

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent for using Scrapingdog through OOMOL, but its first-time setup tells users to execute remote installers directly, which is high-impact and not integrity-checked.

Review the setup steps before installing. Prefer an official package manager or a downloaded, version-pinned installer with signature or checksum verification instead of piping remote scripts directly into a shell. Once installed, the normal connector actions are scoped to Scrapingdog and should still be used with care for target URLs and account data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:60
Finding

Unverified Remote Bash Installer Executed Directly from the Network

Content
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Remediation
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/install.sh" echo " install.sh" | sha256sum --check - less install.sh bash install.sh ``` The actual release URL and checksum must come from the vendor's authenticated, version-specific release process rather than from a mutable endpoint. ]]>

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:64
Finding

Unverified Remote PowerShell Installer Executed Directly from the Network

Content
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Remediation
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/install.ps1" ` -OutFile ".\install.ps1" $signature = Get-AuthenticodeSignature ".\install.ps1" if ($signature.Status -ne "Valid") { throw "Installer signature validation failed." } Get-Content ".\install.ps1" & ".\install.ps1" ``` The expected signer and release location must be independently authenticated and constrained to a specific trusted version. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the operator to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell, which is a classic supply-chain and remote code execution risk. If the install endpoint, CDN, DNS, or transport path is compromised, arbitrary code could execute on the host with the user's privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description says to use this skill for 'ANY Scrapingdog request' and 'Whenever a task involves Scrapingdog', which is a broad activation condition without clear boundaries or exclusions. This can overlap with many ordinary web-searching or data-reading tasks and may cause unintended invocation when Scrapingdog is only tangentially relevant.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.