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Security audit

SafetyCulture

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The SafetyCulture workflow has clear safeguards, but its fallback setup directs the agent to execute an unverified remote installer without a separate approval step.

Review and approve the CLI installation separately before use, including any automatic installation of other agent skills. SafetyCulture requests pass through OOMOL, so consider its access to your account and data. The skill requires confirmation before account changes, but the external installer and hosted connector implementation were not verified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote script execution rather than any demonstrated SafetyCulture operation. Although dependency installation can be a supporting implementation detail, nothing supplied establishes this installer as a SafetyCulture dependency. The downloaded script's contents and further effects cannot be determined from this snippet.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Piping a remotely fetched installer directly into bash executes mutable remote content with the agent process's local privileges, without an integrity check or review boundary. HTTPS and the legitimate relationship to the tooling provider reduce suspicion of malicious intent, but a compromised distribution endpoint could still deliver arbitrary code; the PowerShell alternative has the same underlying risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

Fallback setup executes downloaded installation scripts without warning the user about system changes or remote code execution.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs the agent to install external tooling when the CLI is missing without explicitly requesting approval for executing downloaded code or changing the local environment. The missing-command condition limits exposure, but authorization to perform a SafetyCulture task does not necessarily authorize installing software on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources