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Security audit

Rosette Text Analytics

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The text-analysis workflow fits its purpose, but unchecked installation and undisclosed changes to other agents’ skills need review.

Before use, install a verified, fixed CLI release yourself and review its persistent changes. The CLI documents OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 to prevent startup writes to agent skill directories; see its [environment options](https://github.com/oomol-lab/oo-cli/blob/main/docs/commands.md#environment-variables). Submit only text you authorize OOMOL and Rosette to process. The complete bundled Markdown was inspected, but the remote installer remains unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote software installation, not Rosette data searching or reading. Nothing in the supplied chunk establishes that this installer is a supporting dependency for the declared functionality. The downloaded script's further behavior is not visible.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The setup command pipes a mutable remote script directly into Bash without pinning a version, verifying integrity, or reviewing its contents; the PowerShell alternative has the same issue. Compromise of the installation endpoint or release infrastructure could execute attacker-controlled code with the agent process's permissions, although the command-not-found prerequisite limits exposure to setup scenarios.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

Document-analysis workflow lacks a warning that submitted text is transmitted to third-party services.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit action payloads through OOMOL to Rosette Text Analytics, potentially exposing personal or confidential document content. Although the skill identifies the connector, it does not warn about this data disclosure, and line 48 broadly characterizes untagged actions as safe to run directly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources