T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:63
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Executed Directly by Shells## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 63–67 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Critical The first-time setup instructions execute mutable remote scripts directly in Bash and PowerShell: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis Both installation commands retrieve code from an external URL and immediately pass it to a command interpreter. The retrieved content is not pinned to an immutable release and is not checked using a cryptographic hash or trusted signature. Users and agents therefore cannot verify that the executed payload is the same payload that was reviewed when the Skill was audited. Although `cli.oomol.com` is related to the service declared by the Skill, organizational affiliation alone does not protect against compromise of the hosting infrastructure, deployment pipeline, domain, or installer. The installer can also change after this Skill has been approved without producing any change in the audited project. Installing the required CLI may be functionally necessary for first-time setup, but immediate execution of unverified network content exceeds the minimum privilege and trust required to provide installation guidance. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` command is unavailable and an agent or user follows the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises the installer host, publishing pipeline, domain delivery mechanism, or another trusted component capable of controlling the response. 3. The attacker replaces the expected installer with a malicious shell or PowerShell payload. 4. `curl | bash` or `irm | iex` executes the response immediately, without integrity verification or an inspection step. 5. The malicious payload runs with all permissions held by the user who initiat ...[truncated 905 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` installation instructions. 2. Prefer an established operating-system package manager with a signed repository and a version-pinned package. 3. If standalone installers are necessary, reference an immutable, versioned release artifact rather than a mutable installer URL. 4. Require users to download the installer without executing it, then verify a publisher signature or a SHA-256 digest obtained through an independently authenticated channel. 5. Separate download, verification, inspection, and execution into distinct commands. 6. Display the exact artifact version and expected digest in the instructions. 7. Require explicit user approval before running any installer. 8. Run installation without administrator privileges unless a documented component strictly requires elevation. 9. Publish installer source and release provenance, and use reproducible builds or signed supply-chain attestations where practical. 10. If automated installation remains supported, make the reviewed installer part of a pinned release and fail closed when signature or checksum verification fails.