ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Respond.io

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Respond.io integration is coherent, but setup directs the agent to execute downloaded installers without separate approval or integrity verification.

Review and approve a specific CLI version before allowing installation, and check its automatic skill synchronization settings. OOMOL mediates access to your connected Respond.io account, so limit account permissions and preserve the skill's approval requirements for changes and deletions. The downloaded installers and installed binary were not verified.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs an Oomol CLI installation rather than any Respond.io operation. Nothing in the supplied chunk establishes that this installer is a supporting dependency for Respond.io. The downloaded script's further behavior is not visible and cannot be assessed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping an unpinned HTTPS response directly into bash executes whatever the installer endpoint returns, without an independent integrity check or review. A compromised distribution endpoint or altered installer could execute code with the agent's local privileges and access available files and credentials; the legitimate dependency purpose does not eliminate this supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

Fallback setup executes downloaded installer scripts without warning about remote-code execution or system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs the agent to execute downloaded shell or PowerShell code without explaining the system changes or requiring installation-specific user approval. Restricting installation to a missing-CLI error reduces exposure, but does not make arbitrary remote code execution an expected or authorized consequence of a Respond.io request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources