Reply.io

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Nov 4, 2026 · 6:01 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.5

Overview

Account changes require approval, but setup executes unchecked downloads and the linked CLI documents broader changes to installed agent skills.

Review and preinstall a fixed CLI version before enabling this skill. Consider disabling managed-skill synchronization with the documented OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 setting before its first invocation. Connecting Reply.io entrusts OOMOL with account access and requested data. Retain approval for contact and sequence changes. The sole bundled artifact was fully inspected, but the remote installers and hosted implementation remain unverified.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration

Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The supplied command runs an Oomol-hosted installer rather than performing Reply.io operations. Nothing in the chunk establishes that this installation supports the declared Reply.io functionality. The remote script's contents and resulting system changes are not available for assessment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The setup command immediately executes a remotely fetched, unpinned script without integrity verification or review; the PowerShell alternative has the same weakness. If the distribution endpoint or delivery pipeline is compromised, attacker-controlled code could execute with the agent's local privileges and access local files or credentials. Limiting installation to a missing-CLI error reduces exposure but does not remove the risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

• oo: command not found — install the oo CLI (other platforms: https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md):

  bash

  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  

  powershell

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md

- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources