T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:57- Finding
Unverified Remote Shell Script Download and Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 57
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighComplete Code Snippet:
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / LinuxTechnical Analysis
The installation instruction pipes a remotely retrieved script directly into Bash. Although HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, it does not pin the script to the content reviewed with this Skill. The effective payload remains controlled by the remote host and can change at any time.
No version pinning, cryptographic checksum validation, signature verification, or local review step occurs before execution. If the hosting service, its deployment pipeline, DNS resolution, certificate trust chain, or publishing account is compromised, an attacker can replace the installer and obtain arbitrary shell execution.
Installation is relevant only when the
ooCLI is unavailable, but automatic execution of a mutable script exceeds the minimum privilege necessary to document or invoke the declared remove.bg connector functionality.Attack Path
- The
oocommand is unavailable and an authentication or connector operation fails because the CLI is not installed. - The Agent follows the first-time setup instruction in
SKILL.md. - An attacker has compromised or gained publishing control over
https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh, or otherwise causes the trusted HTTPS endpoint to return attacker-controlled content. curldownloads the current response without validating a pinned digest or signature.- The shell pipeline passes the response directly to Bash.
- The attacker-controlled script executes with all privileges available to the current Agent or user process.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution under the current user's security context. Depending on that context ...[truncated 393 chars]
- The
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Do not pipe downloaded content directly into a shell.
- Distribute a version-pinned release artifact through a documented package manager or trusted release channel.
- Publish a cryptographic digest and a detached signature for each release.
- Download the installer to a local file, verify its signature and digest against independently published values, and only then execute it.
- Allow users to inspect the downloaded script before execution.
- Run installation with an unprivileged account and request elevation only for narrowly defined operations that genuinely require it.
- Keep installation outside normal Skill execution and require explicit user approval before running any installer.
- Prefer guidance similar to:
bash curl -fSLo oo-install.sh "https://cli.oomol.com/releases/<pinned-version>/install.sh" echo "<trusted-sha256> oo-install.sh" | sha256sum -c - bash oo-install.shThe expected digest must come from an authenticated, independently verifiable release channel rather than from the same mutable response.
