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Security audit

Qichacha

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Qichacha lookup workflow fits its purpose, but its fallback setup executes downloaded software without verification or a clear approval step.

Review and approve CLI installation separately before allowing this skill to perform setup. Prefer a pinned, verified installation. Expect queries and connected-account access through OOMOL, with possible service charges. The bundled instructions were fully inspected, but external installer and connector behavior remain unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied command invokes an Oomol installer rather than searching or reading Qichacha data. Nothing in the chunk establishes that this installation supports the declared Qichacha functionality. The downloaded script's contents are not supplied, so its exact effects cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The curl-to-bash command immediately executes mutable remote content without verifying a pinned artifact or inspecting the script. HTTPS protects transport but does not prevent a compromised distribution endpoint from supplying code that can access local files and credentials with the executing user's permissions; this is the same underlying installer risk identified by SQP-2.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow instructs execution of remote installers without a system-integrity warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The fallback setup instructs the agent to execute remotely supplied shell or PowerShell code without prior review, integrity verification, or explicit user approval for installation. Although triggered only when the CLI is missing, this can turn a data-retrieval request into local code execution with the agent's privileges if the installer distribution is compromised; the missing warning alone is not the underlying vulnerability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources