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Security audit

Pod AI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The phone-call workflow requires confirmation, but setup instructs the agent to execute unchecked remote installers without separate approval.

Review and install the CLI separately before enabling this skill, using a verified release where available. OOMOL mediates account access, and outbound calls require confirmation of their exact details. The bundled instructions were fully inspected, but the external installers and CLI implementation were not verified; the Review verdict concerns setup control, with no artifact-backed evidence of malicious intent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote installer execution rather than Pod AI operations. Installing a dependency could be a supporting implementation detail, but nothing supplied establishes that the Oomol installer supports Pod AI. The downloaded script's further behavior cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a mutable remote installer directly into Bash executes whatever the endpoint returns with the invoking user's privileges, without prior inspection or artifact verification. A compromised distribution endpoint could therefore execute arbitrary local code; HTTPS and a relevant vendor domain do not eliminate that supply-chain risk. This overlaps SQP-2, and the declared Bash(oo *) restriction may prevent execution if strictly enforced.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow instructs the agent to execute downloaded installer scripts without warning about the system-integrity implications.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback setup instructs the agent to execute downloaded shell or PowerShell scripts without explicit approval, integrity verification, or an explanation of the resulting system changes. Restricting setup to a missing CLI reduces exposure, but installing software remains a separate trust decision from authorizing a Pod AI action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 76)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources