T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:61- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 61–65
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalThe first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from remote OOMOL endpoints and immediately execute them in the user's shell:
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
Both installation commands pass remotely retrieved content directly to a command interpreter. The downloaded scripts are not pinned to a specific release, inspected before execution, or verified using a cryptographic signature or hard-coded checksum.
HTTPS provides transport security but does not establish that the retrieved script is an immutable, reviewed artifact. If the hosting server, publishing account, DNS/control plane, TLS termination infrastructure, or installer pipeline is compromised, the endpoint can return arbitrary commands. Those commands will execute with all privileges available to the user running the installation.
This installation mechanism is not necessary for the Skill's declared PDFMonkey functionality. The normal connector interface is restricted to
Bash(oo *), but the setup procedure crosses that boundary by allowing an external party to define arbitrary shell or PowerShell commands at execution time. The documentation states that setup should only be used after a command failure, which reduces routine exposure but does not eliminate the execution risk.The audit found no evidence that the current remote scripts are malicious. The vulnerability arises from executing mutable, unverified remote content.
Attack Path
- A threat actor compromises the installer host, publishing credentials, deployment pipeline, DNS/control plane, or another component capable of changing responses from
cli.oomol.com. - The ...[truncated 1566 chars]
- A threat actor compromises the installer host, publishing credentials, deployment pipeline, DNS/control plane, or another component capable of changing responses from
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
curl | bashandirm | iexinstallation patterns. - Direct users to a versioned release artifact from an authenticated official release channel.
- Pin the installation instructions to an explicit CLI version rather than a mutable installer endpoint.
- Download the artifact to disk without executing it automatically.
- Publish platform-specific SHA-256 checksums through a separately protected release process and require verification before installation.
- Prefer operating-system package signing or a verifiable publisher signature in addition to checksum validation.
- Display the exact artifact version, source, expected checksum, and installation effect before requesting explicit user approval.
- Do not permit an agent to install the dependency automatically after a command failure; require a deliberate user-controlled setup step.
- Run installation with standard user privileges unless elevated privileges are strictly required and separately approved.
- Document how users can inspect the downloaded artifact and verify its provenance before execution.
A safer Unix-like workflow should follow this model:
bash curl -fL -o oo-cli.tar.gz "https://trusted.example/releases/oo-cli-VERSION.tar.gz" echo "PINNED_SHA256 oo-cli.tar.gz" | sha256sum --check - # Install only after successful verification and explicit user approval.Equivalent PowerShell instructions should use
Invoke-WebRequestto save a versioned artifact, validate it withGet-FileHash, verify any available publisher signature, and execute it only after explicit approval.- Remove the
