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Security audit

PassSlot

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent for managing PassSlot through OOMOL, but its fallback setup tells users to run an unverified remote installer directly in a shell.

Review this carefully before installing. The PassSlot connector workflow is purpose-aligned, but avoid running the one-line installer commands unless you have independently verified the OOMOL installer source and trust it. Prefer an official signed package, pinned release, or manually inspected installer, and require confirmation before any create, update, or delete action against PassSlot data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions pipe remotely downloaded content directly into Bash or PowerShell. The effective code is therefore controlled by mutable external resources and is not included in the audited project. Neither command pins an installer version nor verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution. HTTPS protects content in transit under normal conditions, but it does not protect users if the distribution server, publishing pipeline, account, or served installer is compromised. Although the URLs use the declared OOMOL service domain, that association does not mitigate the underlying remote-code-execution risk. Installing the required CLI is related to the Skill's functionality, but immediate execution of unverified remote content exceeds the minimum mechanism necessary to perform that installation safely. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` CLI is unavailable, causing the user or agent to follow the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises the installer host, release pipeline, publishing credentials, or other infrastructure capable of changing the response. 3. `curl` or `irm` retrieves the attacker-controlled script. 4. The pipe passes the response directly to `bash` or `iex` without inspection or integrity verification. 5. The malicious script executes with the privileges of the invoking user. ### Impact Assessment A substituted installer can execute arbitrary commands with the invoking user's permissions. Depending on those permissions and the delivered payload, it could access readable files and credentia ...[truncated 438 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` installation patterns. 2. Reference a version-pinned release artifact from the official distribution channel. 3. Download the installer or package to disk without executing it automatically. 4. Publish and require verification of a cryptographic signature or a SHA-256 digest obtained through an independently protected channel. 5. Display the resolved version, source, and verification result before requesting explicit user approval to execute it. 6. Prefer a platform package manager that provides signed packages, version control, and provenance verification. 7. Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a specific, documented step strictly requires elevation. 8. Document how users can inspect the downloaded artifact and abort installation safely if verification fails.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to install software by piping a remote script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This creates a supply-chain and remote code execution risk: if the remote server, transport, or script is compromised, arbitrary commands could run on the host without inspection. In skill context, this is especially dangerous because it appears in 'first-time setup' guidance that may be executed during troubleshooting.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY PassSlot request" and "Whenever a task involves PassSlot," which is a very broad activation condition without boundaries or exclusions. In a manifest file, this can cause unintended invocation for loosely related mentions of PassSlot rather than clearly scoped actions.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.