Back to skill

Security audit

OpenHands

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The OpenHands integration is coherent, but its setup directs the agent to execute downloaded installers without separate user approval or integrity checks.

Review and approve CLI setup separately before allowing the agent to run it; prefer a pinned, verified release. Consider the publisher-documented installation of additional agent skills and OOMOL's role in handling connected-account access. Keep the skill's exact-payload confirmation for OpenHands changes. The external installers were unavailable for inspection.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote installer execution, with no visible OpenHands integration or data operations. Nothing supplied establishes that installing software from cli.oomol.com is a supporting implementation detail of the declared OpenHands functionality. The downloaded script's contents and further effects cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The command pipes a mutable remote script directly into Bash without a pinned version or independent integrity verification. Compromise of the installer endpoint or its publishing pipeline could execute arbitrary code with the user's permissions, exposing local files and credentials; HTTPS and the legitimate setup context do not eliminate that supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow executes downloaded installation scripts without warning the user about the system-integrity implications.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The setup instructions direct execution of downloaded shell and PowerShell scripts without explaining that they run with the invoking user's permissions or requesting installation-specific approval. Limiting setup to a missing CLI reduces exposure, but it does not prevent an agent from treating remote code execution as routine recovery.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources