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Security audit

Moosend

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent Moosend connector, but its setup instructions ask users to execute an unverified remote installer directly in a shell.

Review the oo CLI installation path before installing. Prefer an official package manager, pinned release, or installer with checksum/signature verification instead of running the documented network-to-shell commands. For normal use, confirm any subscriber add/update payload before allowing the skill to change Moosend data.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:58
Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Executed Directly## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58–62 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High **Vulnerable code:** ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and immediately execute them using Bash or PowerShell. No version is pinned, and the instructions do not verify a cryptographic signature or expected checksum before execution. Consequently, the code that users execute can differ from the content available when the Skill was reviewed. HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, but it does not protect against compromise of the hosting service, DNS or certificate infrastructure, the publisher account, or the installation pipeline itself. It also does not establish that a particular audited version is being installed. Installation of the `oo` CLI is relevant to the declared connector functionality, but direct network-to-shell execution exceeds the minimum privilege and trust necessary to perform that installation. A verified package or a downloaded, pinned artifact could provide the same functionality without granting a mutable remote response immediate code-execution authority. ### Attack Path 1. A user attempts to invoke the Skill, but the `oo` command is unavailable. 2. The user follows the documented first-time setup instructions. 3. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installation script, its publishing pipeline, or another trusted delivery component. 4. The user's command downloads the attacker-controlled response. 5. The shell executes the response immediately, without an opportunity for integrity verification or inspection. 6. The payload performs arbitrary actions availa ...[truncated 981 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` execution with installation through a trusted platform package manager where feasible. 2. Pin the CLI to a specific reviewed release rather than fetching an unversioned mutable installer. 3. Publish release artifacts with cryptographic signatures and SHA-256 or stronger checksums through an independent trusted channel. 4. Download the installer or release artifact to a local file, verify its signature and checksum, and only then execute or install it. 5. Document the expected publisher identity, artifact name, version, checksum, and verification commands. 6. Ensure the installer runs with ordinary user privileges by default and clearly warn users not to use `sudo` or an elevated PowerShell session unless a narrowly defined operation requires it. 7. Prefer a minimal, auditable installer that does not make unrelated system changes, collect credentials, or add persistence without explicit user approval. 8. Maintain immutable release URLs and provide a security policy for reporting compromise of the distribution infrastructure.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`). This creates a supply-chain and remote code execution risk because any compromise of the hosting domain, network path, or install script immediately results in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine. In this skill context, the danger is elevated because the installation command is presented as an automatic remediation path for a failed tool invocation, making it more likely an agent or user would run it without independent verification.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.