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Security audit

Moesif

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Moesif integration is coherent, but its setup directs the agent to execute remote installers without clearly explaining their effects or requiring user approval.

Review is warranted for setup behavior, not evidence of malicious intent. Install the CLI through a separately reviewed process, check whether it installs or updates other agent skills, and authorize those changes explicitly. Confirm that OOMOL should mediate access to your Moesif account. The bundled skill was fully inspected, but external installer contents and resulting system changes remain unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied command executes an installer from an unrelated service, with no demonstrated connection to the declared Moesif functionality. This is a materially different operation rather than an evident supporting implementation detail. The remote script's contents are not supplied, so its further effects cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping an HTTPS response directly into bash executes whatever the installer endpoint supplies without a pinned version, integrity verification, or review. Compromise of the hosting or release infrastructure could therefore execute attacker-controlled code with the agent's user permissions; the PowerShell example has the same weakness.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow executes remotely downloaded installer scripts without warning the user about system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The fallback instructs the agent to install software by executing a remote script without first explaining the system changes or obtaining installation-specific approval. Although limited to a missing dependency, this expands a read-oriented Moesif task into arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's permissions; the actual installer behavior is not provided for review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources