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Security audit

Mixmax

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly does what it says for Mixmax, but its setup instructions include an unsafe remote installer command that users should review before installing.

Before installing, use the skill only if you trust OOMOL as the connector provider, review the oo CLI installation path, and prefer a pinned package or verified installer over directly piping a downloaded script into a shell. Once installed, confirm exact recipient-add payloads before allowing write actions in Mixmax.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:58
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Executed Directly by Shells## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 58–62 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: Critical The first-time setup instructions contain the following vulnerable commands: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis Both commands retrieve mutable code from an external server and immediately pass it to a command interpreter. The downloaded content is not included in the audited project, pinned to a specific version, verified against a cryptographic digest, or authenticated through a separately validated publisher signature. Although `cli.oomol.com` is consistent with the declared OOMOL publisher, domain ownership alone does not make direct remote execution safe. Compromise of the hosting infrastructure, release account, DNS resolution, TLS termination, or installer publication process could cause different code to be delivered after this Skill has been reviewed. Immediate piping also prevents meaningful inspection before execution. The remote script inherits the privileges and environment of the user running Bash or PowerShell. Installing the CLI is a one-time setup activity rather than part of normal Mixmax operations, so unrestricted execution of a mutable installer exceeds the minimum privileges necessary for routine Skill use. ### Attack Path 1. A Mixmax operation fails because the `oo` CLI is unavailable. 2. The agent or user follows the documented first-time setup procedure. 3. An attacker compromises a relevant delivery component, such as the installer host, publishing account, DNS/TLS path, or release pipeline. 4. The attacker replaces or modifies `install.sh` or `install.ps1` with malicious commands. 5. `curl` or `irm` retrieves the attacker-controlled response. 6. Bash or PowerShell executes ...[truncated 994 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove both pipe-to-shell installation commands from the Skill instructions. 2. Distribute a version-pinned CLI package or installer through a documented package manager or immutable release URL. 3. Require the installer to be downloaded to a local file before execution rather than passing the network response directly to a shell. 4. Publish a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest through a separately protected channel and verify it before execution. 5. Sign release artifacts with a documented publisher key and require signature verification. 6. Provide explicit inspection and execution steps, for example: download, verify the signature and digest, review the artifact, and only then execute it. 7. Ensure installation uses ordinary user privileges unless a narrowly scoped operation explicitly requires elevation. 8. Pin documentation to a specific tested CLI version and document a controlled update procedure. 9. Prefer directing users to an installation guide over allowing an agent to perform installation automatically.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell, which creates a supply-chain execution risk. If the remote host, distribution path, or TLS trust chain is compromised, arbitrary code would run immediately on the user's machine with the user's privileges.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY Mixmax request," including reading, creating, and updating data, which is extremely broad and overlaps with many ordinary Mixmax-related tasks. It does not provide exclusions, examples of when not to invoke it, or narrower trigger constraints, increasing the risk of unintended activation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.