T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:58- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Executed Directly
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 58–62
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighThe first-time setup instructions execute remotely retrieved installation scripts directly in Bash or PowerShell:
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
Both installation methods pass a mutable network response directly to a command interpreter. The instructions do not pin a release version, validate a cryptographic signature or checksum, or provide an opportunity to inspect the downloaded code before execution.
HTTPS provides transport protection but does not guarantee that the retrieved script is trustworthy if the hosting account, web server, DNS infrastructure, certificate issuance process, or software release pipeline is compromised. Because the effective payload remains under external control after this Skill has been reviewed, it can change without any corresponding modification to the audited project.
Installing a CLI is relevant to the declared MinerU connector functionality, but immediate execution of an unverified remote response exceeds the minimum privileges necessary. A verified package or pinned release artifact could provide the required functionality without granting mutable network content direct access to a local shell.
The documented connector commands also transmit JSON payloads, including document URLs, through OOMOL to MinerU. That data flow is disclosed and necessary for the declared extraction service. The audited content contains no evidence that raw credentials, private keys, environment variables, or unrelated local data are collected or transmitted.
Attack Path
- The
oocommand is unavailable and an agent or user follows the first-time setup instructions. - An attacker compro ...[truncated 1149 chars]
- The
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove all direct pipe-to-shell and download-to-
iexinstallation commands. - Prefer an official operating-system package manager or a signed installer obtained from a pinned release.
- Pin the CLI to a specific version rather than retrieving a mutable installation script.
- Download the artifact to a local file without executing it automatically.
- Publish and verify a SHA-256 checksum and, preferably, a cryptographic signature whose verification key is distributed through an independent trusted channel.
- Display the source, version, destination, permissions, and expected installation changes before execution.
- Require explicit user approval before running any installer, and never install automatically merely because a connector command failed.
- Execute installation with ordinary user privileges unless a narrowly defined operation demonstrably requires elevation.
- Document how users can inspect the artifact and remove the installed CLI.
- Remove all direct pipe-to-shell and download-to-
