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Security audit

Lodgify

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Lodgify connector skill is mostly coherent, but its first-time setup tells users or agents to run unverified remote installer scripts directly in a shell.

Review the setup instructions before installing. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a verified, version-pinned, signed, or package-manager workflow instead of piping a remote script directly into a shell. Also confirm that you are comfortable granting the connector access to Lodgify booking and property data through your OOMOL-connected account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:61
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Is Executed Directly by a Shell## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 61–65 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High **Complete Code Snippet**: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and immediately execute them using Bash or PowerShell. The instructions provide no version pinning, checksum validation, cryptographic signature verification, or opportunity to inspect the downloaded content before execution. HTTPS protects data in transit when the endpoint and certificate infrastructure remain trustworthy, but it does not establish that the script's current or future contents are safe. If the hosting account, web server, DNS resolution, certificate infrastructure, release pipeline, or installer itself is compromised, the commands execute the substituted payload with all privileges available to the invoking user. Installing a CLI is relevant to the Skill's functionality, but granting a mutable remote response immediate shell execution exceeds the minimum safe privilege necessary to perform that installation. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` command is unavailable, causing the documented first-time setup condition. 2. An agent or user follows the installation instructions. 3. An attacker compromises or causes malicious content to be served from the installer endpoint or its delivery pipeline. 4. `curl` or `irm` retrieves the attacker-controlled script. 5. The pipe sends the response directly to Bash, or `iex` evaluates it in PowerShell, without validation or review. 6. The payload executes with the invoking user's privileges and can perform arbitrary actions within that security context. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provides arbit ...[truncated 417 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove both direct download-to-shell installation patterns. 2. Direct users to a pinned release of the official CLI rather than a mutable installer endpoint. 3. Download the artifact to a local file without executing it. 4. Verify a publisher-provided cryptographic signature and a checksum obtained through a separately protected channel. 5. Inspect or audit the downloaded installer before execution. 6. Execute installation with ordinary user privileges unless a narrowly scoped elevated operation is demonstrably required. 7. Prefer a trusted package manager that supports signed metadata and version pinning. 8. Document the exact expected publisher, release version, hashes, and verification commands. 9. Apply equivalent controls to both the Bash and PowerShell installation paths.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to install software via a remote script piped directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`), which executes unverified code from the network without integrity checking or review. If the server, CDN, DNS, TLS termination, or distribution pipeline is compromised, this can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The manifest description says to use this skill for "ANY Lodgify request" and "Whenever a task involves Lodgify," which is an extremely broad activation condition. It does not provide scope boundaries or negative examples, so ordinary mentions of Lodgify could match unintentionally.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.