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Security audit

Listmonk

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Listmonk connector is mostly coherent, but it needs review because setup can run an unpinned remote installer and the skill can modify, delete, or send mailing-list data.

Review the oo CLI installation path before installing. Prefer installing from verified OOMOL documentation or a pinned, checksum-verified release, and require explicit confirmation before any Listmonk write, delete, blocklist, schedule, or send action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to install software using a remote script piped directly into a shell (curl ... | bash). This is dangerous because it executes unreviewed code fetched at runtime from an external server, enabling supply-chain compromise, man-in-the-middle abuse, or unexpected privilege-impacting changes on the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill description says to use this skill for ANY Listmonk request and instead of calling the API directly, which creates a very broad trigger surface. That can cause the agent to invoke this skill for all Listmonk-related tasks, including sensitive write or destructive operations, increasing the chance of unintended execution or overreach if user intent is ambiguous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.