T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:62
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High **Complete Code Snippet**: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions retrieve mutable scripts from external URLs and execute them immediately through Bash or PowerShell. Neither installation path pins a release version, validates a cryptographic digest or publisher signature, presents the downloaded content for inspection, nor explicitly asks the user to approve execution. HTTPS protects data in transit but does not establish that the current script is identical to the version reviewed with this Skill. If the hosting service, publishing account, delivery infrastructure, or remote installer is compromised or modified, arbitrary code can be supplied after the Skill has passed review. The PowerShell use of `Invoke-Expression` (`iex`) presents the same fundamental risk as piping `curl` output into Bash. Installing the `oo` CLI may be necessary to use the declared Lattice connector, but immediate execution of an unverified, remotely mutable installer exceeds the minimum privilege and trust required. A verified, version-pinned installation process would provide the same functionality with a smaller supply-chain attack surface. ### Attack Path 1. A user asks the Agent to perform a Lattice operation. 2. The Agent attempts to invoke `oo`, but the command is unavailable. 3. Following the first-time setup instructions, the Agent requests the installer from `cli.oomol.com`. 4. An attacker who has compromised the installer, its publishing channel, or its delivery infrastructure returns modified script content. 5. The shell executes the response immediately without integrity verification or prior inspection. 6. The malicious insta ...[truncated 721 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove both pipe-to-shell installation patterns, including `curl | bash` and `Invoke-Expression`. 2. Prefer a trusted package manager or a documented manual installation workflow. 3. Pin the CLI to a specific reviewed release rather than downloading a mutable latest installer. 4. Download the artifact without executing it, then verify a publisher signature and a separately distributed, pinned SHA-256 digest. 5. Present the source, version, destination, and intended installation effects to the user before execution. 6. Require explicit user approval before running any installer. 7. Execute the installer with the least privileges required and do not request elevation unless it is essential and separately approved. 8. If script-based installation remains unavoidable, save the script locally, validate it, allow inspection, and invoke it as a separate command only after verification. 9. Document that Lattice request and response data is processed through OOMOL’s connector infrastructure so users can make an informed decision before transmitting business data.