T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:62
- Finding
- Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Executed Directly by Shells## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote download and immediate execution of mutable code **Risk Level**: Critical ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download installer scripts from `cli.oomol.com` and execute them immediately through Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins an immutable installer version nor verifies a cryptographic signature or expected checksum before execution. Consequently, the code ultimately executed is not the code reviewed in this Skill. It can change whenever the remote resource changes. The pipe-to-shell pattern also prevents meaningful inspection before execution and creates a supply-chain execution boundary dependent on the remote server, its deployment pipeline, DNS, TLS infrastructure, and related hosting components. Installing the `oo` CLI is relevant when the required command is unavailable, but executing an unverified remote response directly is not the minimum safe mechanism needed to install it. The Skill otherwise limits its declared tool access to `Bash(oo *)`; these installation instructions introduce an execution path for arbitrary shell content outside that narrow command scope. ### Attack Path 1. A Laposta action fails because the `oo` command is unavailable. 2. The first-time setup section directs the user or agent to invoke the applicable installer command. 3. The command retrieves a mutable script from `https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh` or `https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1`. 4. The downloaded response is passed directly to Bash or PowerShell without integrity or authenticity verification beyond transport-level TLS. 5. If the remote resource or its delivery infrastructure has been compromised, attacker-controlled code exe ...[truncated 927 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove both direct pipe-to-shell installation commands. 2. Prefer an established package manager with a version-pinned package and verified publisher. 3. If a standalone installer is necessary, download a versioned artifact to a local file rather than executing the HTTP response directly. 4. Publish expected SHA-256 or stronger checksums through a separately protected release channel and verify the downloaded artifact before execution. 5. Cryptographically sign release artifacts and document signature verification against a pinned, trusted signing key. 6. Require the user to inspect and explicitly approve the installer before it runs. 7. Do not install software automatically merely because an action fails; return the failure and present installation as a separate, user-approved operation. 8. Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a documented component strictly requires additional privileges. 9. Pin installation instructions to a specific CLI release rather than a mutable generic `install.sh` or `install.ps1` endpoint. 10. Preserve the existing rule that setup is attempted only after a matching failure, but direct users to verified manual installation documentation instead of executing remote content immediately.