La Growth Machine

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Nov 4, 2026 · 5:47 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.5

Overview

The account operations have clear safeguards, but setup runs unverified downloaded code and does not disclose the CLI’s broader changes to agent skills.

Review and verify a specific CLI release before installing it. If you do not want additional agent skills installed or refreshed, configure the documented OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 setting before invoking the CLI. Connect only the intended account and review every write payload. The skill’s account safeguards are appropriate, but the mutable installer could not be inspected.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration

Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The supplied code installs software from Oomol rather than performing La Growth Machine operations. Nothing in the chunk establishes this installer as a supporting dependency for the declared purpose. The downloaded script is not supplied, so its additional behavior cannot be assessed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The fallback pipes a remotely fetched, unpinned installer directly into Bash; the PowerShell alternative similarly evaluates downloaded content. If the installer endpoint or its delivery infrastructure is compromised, an agent following this step could execute attacker-controlled code with its local privileges, exposing files, credentials, and the environment. The documented dependency and missing-CLI condition make the behavior understandable but do not establish the downloaded code's integrity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

• oo: command not found — install the oo CLI (other platforms: https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md):

  bash

  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  

  powershell

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md

- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources