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Security audit

Keepa

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for using Keepa through OOMOL, but its setup instructions tell users or agents to execute remote installer scripts directly without version pinning or integrity checks.

Install only if you trust OOMOL and are comfortable using its Keepa connector. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a verified, documented release path, inspect installer contents before running them, avoid elevated shells, and understand that OOMOL will broker Keepa requests through your connected account.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High The first-time setup instructions provide equivalent unsafe installation commands for macOS/Linux and Windows: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis Both commands retrieve mutable content from an external server and execute it immediately in a local shell. The instructions do not pin an installer version, verify a cryptographic checksum or publisher signature, or provide an opportunity to inspect the downloaded code before execution. Consequently, the code executed on a user's machine can differ from the content available when this Skill was audited. Although installing the `oo` CLI supports the declared Keepa integration, piping an unverified download directly into a shell exceeds the minimum mechanism necessary to install that dependency safely. The audit found no evidence that the current remote installer is malicious. Nevertheless, compromise of the hosting service, its deployment pipeline, DNS or TLS trust infrastructure, or the installer artifact itself could turn these commands into an arbitrary-code execution channel. ### Attack Path 1. The agent attempts to use the Skill and discovers that the `oo` command is unavailable. 2. Following the first-time setup instructions, it retrieves `install.sh` or `install.ps1` from `cli.oomol.com`. 3. An attacker who has compromised the distribution endpoint or its delivery chain substitutes malicious installer content. 4. The pipeline passes that content directly to Bash or PowerShell without integrity verification. 5. The malicious payload executes with the permissions of the user who invoked the command. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provid ...[truncated 699 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove both direct download-to-shell pipelines. 2. Pin the CLI to a specific reviewed version rather than retrieving a mutable installer. 3. Download the release artifact to a local file without executing it automatically. 4. Verify the artifact using a hard-coded SHA-256 checksum and, where available, a publisher signature backed by a documented trust root. 5. Execute the verified artifact only after displaying its origin, version, expected privileges, and intended changes and obtaining explicit user approval. 6. Prefer a trusted operating-system package manager or signed release package with version pinning. 7. Ensure installation runs without elevation unless system-wide installation is strictly required. 8. Document the files, directories, and configuration modified by installation so users can assess scope and remove the CLI safely.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.