ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

ipdata.co

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s normal ipdata.co lookup behavior is coherent, but its fallback setup tells users to run remote installer scripts directly in a shell.

Use this skill with review if you already trust and have installed the OOMOL oo CLI. Do not let an agent run the documented curl|bash or irm|iex installer automatically; prefer a verified package or inspect and verify the installer first. Expect IP addresses you look up to be sent through OOMOL’s connector to ipdata.co under your connected account.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:82
Finding

Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Executed Directly by Shell Interpreters

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 82–90
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Critical

Vulnerable Code

bash
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
  irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex           # Windows PowerShell
  ```

Technical Analysis

The installation instructions retrieve mutable content from remote OOMOL endpoints and immediately pass it to bash or PowerShell for execution. The scripts are not included in the audited project, pinned to an immutable release, checked against an expected digest, or required to pass cryptographic signature verification.

HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, but it does not make the remotely hosted payload immutable or independently verifiable. A compromised hosting account, distribution service, DNS path, certificate infrastructure, or legitimate but unsafe update to either script could alter the code executed after this Skill has been reviewed.

Installing a prerequisite is ancillary to the declared IP lookup functionality and requires substantially broader privileges than submitting lookup requests. The document limits this procedure to a first-time fallback after an oo: command not found error, which reduces exposure but does not address the integrity risk. The PowerShell instruction has the same vulnerability as the Unix instruction because iex evaluates the downloaded response directly.

Attack Path

  1. The user attempts to use the Skill on a system where the oo CLI is unavailable.
  2. The missing-command error causes the documented first-time installation fallback to be used.
  3. An attacker compromises or otherwise gains control over the content returned by `cli.oomol. ...[truncated 1446 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove both direct network-to-interpreter pipelines. Download installation artifacts to disk without executing them automatically.
  2. Use a trusted platform package manager or a release artifact pinned to an explicit, immutable CLI version.
  3. Publish expected SHA-256 or stronger digests through a separately protected channel and verify the downloaded artifact before execution.
  4. Prefer signed releases and verify the signature against a pinned, documented publisher key.
  5. Fail closed if any checksum, signature, version, or publisher verification fails.
  6. Present the verified file and its source to the user and require explicit approval before running it.
  7. Perform installation with the least-privileged account possible and avoid administrative elevation unless a clearly identified operation requires it.
  8. Keep prerequisite installation outside normal Skill execution. The Skill should report that the CLI is missing rather than autonomously installing it.
  9. If scripts remain the distribution format, vendor a reviewed version in a trusted release, pin its version and digest, and document all filesystem, network, and privilege effects before execution.
  10. Apply equivalent controls to both the Unix shell and Windows PowerShell installation paths.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to install the CLI via curl ... | bash, which downloads and immediately executes a remote script without integrity verification, pinning, or review. If the install host, CDN, DNS, or TLS trust path were compromised, this could result in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The description says to use this skill for "ANY ipdata.co request" and "Whenever a task involves ipdata.co," which is a very broad activation condition. It does not provide limiting conditions or negative examples, so ordinary discussion or indirect references to ipdata.co could trigger the skill unnecessarily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.