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Security audit

Intelliprint

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its stated Intelliprint purpose, but its setup instructions can run an unverified downloaded installer script.

Install only if you trust OOMOL and are comfortable connecting your Intelliprint account through its connector. Avoid letting an agent run the installer blindly; use an official reviewed installation method or verify the installer before execution.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 62–66
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution through pipe-to-shell installation commands
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code:

bash
curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
powershell
irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex           # Windows PowerShell

Technical Analysis

The documented installation commands retrieve mutable scripts from external URLs and pass their contents directly to Bash or PowerShell. The scripts are executed without version pinning, cryptographic signature verification, checksum validation, local inspection, or confirmation of the received content.

The URLs use an OOMOL domain consistent with the documented CLI, and installation is presented as a conditional first-time setup step rather than normal connector operation. Nevertheless, the installer source is not included in the audited project, so its current or future behavior cannot be verified from this package. Domain consistency alone does not protect against compromise of the hosting infrastructure, publisher account, DNS, TLS delivery path, or installer deployment process.

This behavior exceeds the minimum privilege required for the Skill's declared read-only Intelliprint functionality. Normal operation only requires invoking the restricted oo CLI commands. Automatically following these fallback instructions introduces a separate arbitrary-code execution channel whose effective payload can change after the Skill has been reviewed.

Attack Path

  1. The oo CLI is absent, causing an oo: command not found failure.
  2. An agent or user follows the first-time setup instructions in SKILL.md.
  3. The system downloads install.sh or install.ps1 from the external OOMOL endpoint.
  4. An attacker who has compromised the endpoint, publishing account, domain resolution, or delivery infrastructure subs ...[truncated 1472 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove both pipe-to-shell installation commands from the Skill instructions.
  2. Direct users to an official package manager or a manually downloadable, version-pinned release artifact.
  3. Publish cryptographic checksums through an independently protected channel and require verification before execution.
  4. Prefer platform-native publisher signatures, such as signed packages or signed PowerShell scripts, and document signature verification.
  5. Separate download and execution into distinct steps so the installer can be inspected before it runs.
  6. Require explicit user approval before installing software; the Skill should not automatically install the CLI after a command failure.
  7. Pin the expected CLI version rather than retrieving a mutable latest installer.
  8. Run installation with ordinary user privileges wherever possible and avoid requesting administrator or root access unless a documented component strictly requires it.
  9. Provide reproducible installer source or an auditable release repository corresponding exactly to each distributed artifact.
  10. Continue limiting routine Skill execution to Bash(oo *), which is appropriately narrower than unrestricted shell access, and caution users not to include unrelated secrets in connector payloads.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to install software by piping a remote script directly into a shell (curl ... | bash). This creates a supply-chain and remote code execution risk: if the install endpoint, transport, hosting, or upstream release process is compromised, arbitrary code will run immediately on the user's machine with the user's privileges. In a skill context, this is more dangerous because the document explicitly tells the agent when to execute the command as part of remediation flow, making unsafe execution more likely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.