T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:58- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 58-62
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
Both installation commands retrieve mutable content from an external server and pass it directly to a command interpreter. The downloaded content is not saved for inspection and is not verified using a pinned cryptographic hash or a validated release signature.
HTTPS protects the connection in transit but does not establish that the retrieved script is the same version that was reviewed. If the hosting service, publishing account, DNS resolution, certificate infrastructure, or delivery pipeline is compromised, the effective installer can be changed after this Skill has been audited.
This behavior is not necessary for ordinary connector operations. The document states that the CLI should already be installed and that setup is only a fallback after a command failure. Moreover, the declared tool permission is
Bash(oo *), while installation requires invokingcurland a shell outside that narrow operational interface. Executing a general-purpose installer therefore exceeds the minimum privileges required to call the Instantly.ai connector.The finding applies to both the Unix shell pipeline and the equivalent PowerShell download-and-execute pipeline.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises or gains control over
cli.oomol.com, its deployment pipeline, its DNS path, or another component capable of altering the installer response. - The attacker replaces
install.shorinstall.ps1with a malicious payload. - The
oocommand is unavailable, causing the Skill to enter its documented first-time setup flow. - The agent or user executes the provid ...[truncated 1280 chars]
- An attacker compromises or gains control over
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove direct
curl | bashandirm | iexinstructions. - Direct users to a versioned, human-readable installation guide or a trusted operating-system package manager.
- Pin the CLI to a specific release rather than retrieving a mutable installer endpoint.
- Download the release artifact to disk before execution and verify a publisher-provided SHA-256 digest or cryptographic signature whose trust root is distributed separately.
- Display the artifact path, expected version, checksum, publisher, and intended changes, then require explicit user approval before running it.
- Keep installation outside the Skill's automated execution path. If
oois absent, report the condition and ask the user to install it independently. - Do not request administrator privileges unless a documented installation step strictly requires them. Prefer a user-local installation directory.
- Preserve the narrow
Bash(oo *)permission boundary and ensure the Skill cannot invoke downloaders, general-purpose shells, PowerShell expression evaluation, or unapproved executables. - If an installer script remains necessary, publish immutable versioned scripts, sign releases, document their expected behavior, and avoid piping network responses directly into interpreters.
- Remove direct
