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Security audit

HelloLeads

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The HelloLeads workflow is coherent, but its automatic setup can execute unverified downloaded code without separate approval.

Review and approve CLI installation separately before using this skill, preferably with a verified, fixed release. Review its automatic agent-skill synchronization and understand that HelloLeads data passes through OOMOL. The downloaded installers were unavailable for inspection; no malicious behavior was established in the bundled artifact.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied command installs software from an external service rather than performing HelloLeads data operations. Nothing in the provided chunk establishes this installer as a supporting dependency for the declared purpose. The remote script's contents and subsequent effects are not available for assessment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a live HTTPS response directly into bash executes mutable remote code without checking a pinned version, signature, or independently trusted digest. The official-looking CLI source and missing-command prerequisite make the operation understandable, but do not prevent installer-source compromise from yielding code execution with the invoking user's privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

Fallback setup executes downloaded installer scripts without warning about their system-level effects.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs the agent to execute downloaded shell or PowerShell code without explaining its potential host-level effects or obtaining installation-specific approval. Although installing a required CLI is legitimate, this expands a HelloLeads task into arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's privileges; compromise of the installer source could expose accessible files and credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources