Google Slides

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Nov 3, 2026 · 10:49 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.6

Overview

The Slides workflow requires approval for changes, but its setup leaves broader software and persistent agent changes insufficiently controlled.

Review and verify the CLI installation separately, and consider the Google permissions and presentation data entrusted to OOMOL. Before running it, decide whether additional agent skills may be installed or synchronized; the publisher documents OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 to suppress startup skill writes. Keep the explicit approval gates for presentation changes. The installer contents and exact installed release were not verified. [CLI controls](https://github.com/oomol-lab/oo-cli/blob/main/docs/commands.md#environment-variables).

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration

Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The supplied code performs only a remote installer invocation, not Google Slides operations. Although dependency installation can be a supporting implementation detail, the supplied chunk establishes no relationship between this installer and the declared functionality. The downloaded script's contents and any further effects are not available for assessment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The fallback pipes a mutable remote installer directly into Bash without a pinned version, independent integrity verification, or review; the PowerShell alternative has the same issue. Compromise of the installer endpoint or its publishing infrastructure could execute arbitrary code with the agent's local privileges and access local files or credentials, although the missing-CLI condition limits when this path is reached.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

• oo: command not found — install the oo CLI (other platforms: https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md):

  bash

  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  

  powershell

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md

- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources