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Security audit

Google Cloud STS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill appears to be a Google Cloud token-exchange helper, but it under-discloses sensitive token handling and uses risky first-time install commands.

Review this skill before installing. Only use it if you intentionally want an agent to request a Google Cloud federated access token through OOMOL, and treat any returned token as a secret. Prefer safer CLI installation instructions with pinned versions and verification, and avoid letting the skill run token issuance automatically as a normal read/search action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Downloaded and Executed Directly

Content
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): ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions pipe remotely downloaded content directly into a command interpreter. On macOS and Linux, `curl` sends the response to `bash`; on Windows, `Invoke-RestMethod` downloads the response and `Invoke-Expression` executes it. Neither command pins a release version, validates a cryptographic signature, nor checks an expected digest. Consequently, the code executed by users can differ from the content available when this Skill was reviewed. HTTPS protects the transport connection but does not establish that the installer remains unchanged or safe after a compromise of the server, publishing credentials, DNS infrastructure, or delivery pipeline. Although installing the required CLI supports the declared functionality, direct remote-to-shell execution is not necessary and exceeds the minimum safe installation mechanism. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the installer host, deployment pipeline, domain, or credentials used to publish `install.sh` or `install.ps1`. 2. The attacker replaces the installer response with a malicious script. 3. The `oo` command is unavailable, causing the user or Agent to follow the documented first-time setup procedure. 4. The shell pipeline downloads the current attacker-controlled response and executes it immediately without integrity verification or review. 5. The payload executes with the privileges of the invoking account and can access resources available to that account. ...[truncated 636 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:39
Finding

Google Cloud Bearer Token Returned to the CLI and Agent Context

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documented action returns a Google Cloud access token, which is a bearer credential and therefore inherently sensitive. In this skill context, exposing token issuance through a generally described skill is dangerous because the token could be exfiltrated, logged, or reused to access Google Cloud resources within its granted scope.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

md
## Available actions

- `get_federated_access_token` — Exchange the connected OOMOL OIDC token with Google Cloud Workload Identity Federation and return a Google Cloud access token.

## Safety

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The safety section claims untagged actions are safe read operations, yet the listed untagged action returns an access token. Credential issuance is not a read-only operation in a security sense; treating it as safe-to-run can cause automatic execution of a highly sensitive action and enable credential exposure or privilege misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The first-time setup instructs users to execute a remote installation script via 'curl | bash', which is a classic supply-chain risk. If the remote host, transport, or script distribution path is compromised, arbitrary code will execute on the user's machine with the user's privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 55)May include surrounding context.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is advertised as being for 'searching and reading data,' but the only documented action mints and returns a Google Cloud access token. That is a material capability mismatch that can mislead an agent or user into invoking a credential-issuing operation under the assumption it is a harmless read, increasing the risk of unauthorized token acquisition and downstream API access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger language says to use this skill for ANY Google Cloud STS request, which is overly broad for a skill whose documented capability is token exchange. This can steer unrelated STS-adjacent tasks into a credential-minting workflow and increase accidental invocation of a sensitive action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.