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Security audit

flomo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The flomo workflow has clear approval controls, but its CLI dependency can persistently change other agent skills without that being explained here.

Review the CLI's broader effects before use. Install a reviewed release separately, and set OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 before running it if you do not want automatic changes to installed agent skills; this control is documented upstream. Trust in OOMOL is also required for handling connected flomo data. The complete bundled skill was inspected, but the remote installers and hosted service implementation were not verified. [CLI controls](https://github.com/oomol-lab/oo-cli/blob/main/docs/commands.md)

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (3)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The only demonstrated behavior is remote script execution for an Oomol CLI installer, rather than flomo data management. Dependency installation can be a supporting implementation detail, but the supplied content does not establish that relationship here. The downloaded script's contents are unavailable, so no additional behavior is inferred.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The fallback pipes a mutable remote script directly into bash without pinning or independently verifying its integrity; the PowerShell alternative uses the same download-and-execute pattern. Compromise of the distribution endpoint could execute arbitrary code with the agent's local permissions, exposing accessible files and credentials. The legitimate dependency and missing-CLI condition reduce suspicion of malicious intent but do not remove the supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources