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Security audit

Findymail

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Findymail workflow fits its purpose, but its automatic setup executes unverified downloaded code without a separate approval step.

Review the setup before installing. Install a verified, fixed-version CLI yourself and require approval for installation changes. Review or disable its automatic skill synchronization, and connect Findymail only if you accept OOMOL handling the integration. The remote installers' exact effects remain unverified; no malicious behavior was established.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied command performs remote installer execution, not Findymail data access. Nothing in the code establishes that this installer is a supporting dependency for Findymail, so its installation behavior and unrelated resource access materially differ from the declared purpose. The downloaded script is not supplied, so its further effects cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a remote HTTPS response directly into Bash executes mutable external code without inspecting or verifying the artifact. Compromise of the distribution endpoint or its delivery pipeline could yield arbitrary execution, access to local secrets, and modification of files within the agent's privileges; the legitimate dependency-installation purpose does not eliminate this supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

The setup workflow executes downloaded installation scripts without warning about the system-integrity implications.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The fallback directs the agent to execute downloaded installation scripts without explicit user approval, integrity verification, or an explanation that installation changes the local system. Although limited to a missing-dependency scenario, a compromised installer could execute arbitrary commands with the agent process's privileges; this overlaps with SC2 rather than representing a separate exploit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources