T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:67- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 67–71
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Criticalbash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve mutable scripts from an external server and execute them immediately through Bash or PowerShell. Neither command pins a specific installer version, saves the script for review, nor verifies a cryptographic signature or checksum before execution.
Although the download hostname is consistent with the declared OOMOL service, the effective code is controlled remotely and can change after this Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the hosting infrastructure, installer publishing process, DNS resolution, or trusted TLS chain could therefore turn the documented installation process into arbitrary local code execution.
This behavior is not required for routine Feathery operations when the CLI is already installed. Even during first-time setup, immediate pipe-to-shell execution exceeds the minimum safe installation behavior because verified packages or separately downloaded and authenticated artifacts could be used instead.
The Skill otherwise states that Feathery payloads are sent through OOMOL's connector and that credentials are injected server-side. That network behavior is declared and necessary for the connector model; the reviewed file contains no evidence of covert transmission to an unrelated endpoint.
Attack Path
- The
ooCLI is unavailable, causing an attempted connector operation to fail. - The user or agent follows the first-time setup instructions in
SKILL.md. curlorirmretrieves the current installer script from the external OOMOL endpoint.- The response body is passed directly to Bash or `Invoke-Expres ...[truncated 1026 chars]
- The
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove both direct pipe-to-shell installation commands.
- Direct users to a version-pinned release obtained from an official release page or trusted package manager.
- Download the installer to disk as a separate step so it can be inspected before execution.
- Publish a SHA-256 digest through an independently protected channel and require verification before running the artifact.
- Prefer cryptographic signature verification with a pinned vendor signing key over checksums alone.
- Fail closed when verification fails; do not fall back automatically to executing an unverified script.
- Document the exact permissions and filesystem changes required by the installer, and ensure it runs without administrator or root privileges unless a narrowly defined operation genuinely requires elevation.
- For automated environments, pin both the installer version and expected digest rather than retrieving a mutable latest-version script.
