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Security audit

eSignatures.com

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This eSignatures.com skill is mostly coherent, but its first-time setup tells users to execute a remote installer directly in the shell without verification.

Review the setup path before installing. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a verified official package or by downloading and inspecting/verifying the installer first, and confirm exact payloads before any contract/template creation or withdrawal action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Executed Directly by Shell Interpreters## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from an external server and immediately pass their contents to Bash or PowerShell. Neither path pins an immutable installer version nor performs checksum or publisher-signature verification before execution. HTTPS provides transport protection but does not establish that the retrieved script is the same payload that was reviewed. A compromised hosting server, publishing account, content delivery system, or other delivery infrastructure could replace the installer. The modified response would then execute without an opportunity for inspection. Installation of the declared CLI is relevant to the Skill's operation, and the instructions are only presented as a fallback when the CLI is unavailable. However, granting a mutable remote response immediate shell execution exceeds the minimum privilege necessary to install the dependency securely. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` CLI is unavailable, causing the agent or user to follow the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer delivery path. 3. The attacker replaces `install.sh` or `install.ps1` with a malicious payload. 4. `curl` or `Invoke-RestMethod` retrieves the attacker-controlled response. 5. The pipe sends that response directly to `bash`, or `iex` evaluates it in PowerShell. 6. The payload executes locally with all permissions available to the invoking user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation provides arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running th ...[truncated 550 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Remove all direct `curl | bash` and `Invoke-RestMethod | Invoke-Expression` installation patterns. - Direct users to an official package manager or a pinned, immutable CLI release. - Download the installer or binary to a local file without executing it immediately. - Verify a publisher signature and a SHA-256 checksum obtained through a separately trusted channel. - Pin the expected CLI version and checksum rather than retrieving a mutable latest-version installer. - Execute the verified artifact with ordinary user privileges and request elevated privileges only for narrowly defined operations that require them. - Document the expected files, installation paths, and system changes so users can review the installation. - If script-based installation remains necessary, show separate download, verification, inspection, and execution commands rather than piping network output into an interpreter.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to install software via a remote script piped directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`), which prevents meaningful inspection before execution and creates a supply-chain execution path if the host, CDN, DNS, or transport is compromised. Because this appears in a troubleshooting/setup path for a security-relevant integration, an agent or user following it could execute attacker-controlled code on the local system.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY eSignatures.com request" and "Whenever a task involves eSignatures.com," which is a very broad activation condition. For a markdown skill description, this lacks narrower trigger scope or exclusion examples and could cause unintended invocation on loosely related mentions of eSignatures.com.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.