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Security audit

Dropcontact

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Dropcontact workflow has appropriate controls, but its setup fallback executes downloaded installation code without separate user approval.

Review and install the CLI separately before allowing the skill to run, including any additional agent skills it installs. The remote installer was unavailable for inspection. Confirm which contacts will be processed through OOMOL and Dropcontact, and retain the required approval before submitting them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied command performs remote installer execution rather than the declared Dropcontact operations. Nothing in the chunk establishes this installer as a supporting dependency for Dropcontact. The downloaded script is not supplied, so its further behavior cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping the HTTPS installer directly into bash executes mutable remote content without prior inspection or independent integrity verification; the PowerShell alternative has the same issue. OOMOL is relevant to the integration, but compromise of its distribution infrastructure could turn the fallback into arbitrary code execution with the agent's local permissions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

Fallback setup instructs execution of remote installation scripts without a system-impact warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The missing-CLI fallback directs the agent to execute a remote installer without explaining the system changes or obtaining installation-specific approval. Its conditional nature limits exposure, but a routine Dropcontact request can still trigger execution with the agent's local permissions; this overlaps with the SC2 finding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources