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Security audit

CrateDB Cloud

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The cloud-reading workflow fits its purpose, but setup tells the agent to execute downloaded installers without verification or a separate approval step.

Review and approve the CLI installation separately, preferably using a verified, pinned release, and use read-only CrateDB credentials. Consider OOMOL's access to your connection and results, plus the CLI's additional agent-skill installation behavior. The bundled instructions were fully inspected; downloaded software and live connector behavior remain unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied command executes an Oomol-hosted installer, with no visible CrateDB Cloud interaction. This is a materially different capability from the declared data-access purpose, and the supplied content establishes no connection that would justify it as a supporting implementation detail. The downloaded script's contents and further effects are not shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The command pipes a mutable remote script directly into bash without pinning or independently verifying its contents. Compromise of the distribution endpoint or release process could execute arbitrary code with the agent's local permissions; HTTPS protects transport but does not establish that the script itself is safe.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

First-time setup executes downloaded installation scripts without warning the user about remote code execution or system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The fallback instructs the agent to execute downloaded shell or PowerShell code without first explaining the system changes or obtaining approval. A missing CLI can therefore turn a read-only cloud request into local software installation with the agent's operating-system permissions, exceeding the apparent scope of the user's request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources