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Security audit

ClickUp MCP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent for ClickUp access, but its first-time setup asks users or agents to run an unverified remote installer directly in a shell.

Review the oo CLI installer before running it, prefer a signed or package-manager installation path if available, and do not run the install command from an elevated shell. Once the CLI is already installed and connected, the skill's ClickUp actions are clearly described, with write actions requiring confirmation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Immediate Shell Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 62–66 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High The first-time setup instructions execute remotely hosted installation scripts directly in a local shell: ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis Both installation commands combine retrieval and execution into a single operation. The downloaded scripts are not pinned to a reviewed version, verified with a cryptographic checksum or signature, or saved for inspection before execution. Consequently, the effective code executed by the Skill can change after the package has been audited. Although the URLs appear associated with the declared OOMOL service, transport-layer security alone does not establish the integrity of the changing installer. Compromise of the vendor infrastructure, domain, CDN, DNS resolution, publishing credentials, or installer generation process could result in arbitrary attacker-controlled commands being executed. Immediate shell execution is not the minimum privilege necessary for the Skill's primary functionality, which is invoking an already installed `oo` CLI to access the ClickUp connector. Installation may be a legitimate fallback when the CLI is absent, but automatically executing an unverified remote script grants substantially broader capabilities than connector invocation requires. ### Attack Path 1. The `oo` CLI is unavailable, causing the user or agent to follow the first-time setup instructions. 2. An attacker compromises or otherwise gains control over the remotely served installer content or its delivery path. 3. The user or agent runs the documented `curl | bash` or `irm | iex` command. 4. The shell executes the remotely supplied payload immediately, without independent integri ...[truncated 809 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove all instructions that pipe downloaded content directly into a shell or use `Invoke-Expression`. 2. Prefer installation through a trusted platform package manager using a signed, versioned package. 3. If a standalone installer is necessary, pin it to a specific reviewed release rather than a mutable generic URL. 4. Download the installer to a local file as a separate step and do not execute it automatically. 5. Publish an expected SHA-256 or stronger digest through an independently protected release channel and verify it before execution. 6. Where supported, require verification of a cryptographic signature tied to a documented vendor signing identity. 7. Display the installer source or provide clear inspection instructions and obtain explicit user approval before running it. 8. Run installation without administrative privileges unless a documented component strictly requires elevation. 9. Keep installation outside normal Skill execution; the Skill should ordinarily use only the allowed, already installed `oo` command.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.