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Security audit

Celigo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Celigo features fit the stated purpose, but fallback setup directs the agent to execute unverified downloaded code without clear user approval.

Review and install the CLI separately using a verified release before enabling this skill, and require approval for installation changes. Celigo access is mediated by OOMOL, so consider the connected account's permissions and data sensitivity. The concern is uncontrolled setup execution; the artifacts do not establish malicious intent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs remote script execution rather than searching or reading Celigo data. Nothing in the chunk establishes that this installation is a supporting dependency for Celigo access. The downloaded script's contents are unavailable, so its further behavior cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a remotely fetched script directly into Bash executes mutable network-delivered code without a pinned version or independent integrity verification; the PowerShell fallback has the same weakness. Compromise of the distribution endpoint could execute attacker-controlled code with the invoking user's privileges, potentially exposing local files and credentials; HTTPS and the legitimate setup purpose do not eliminate this supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

Fallback setup executes remote installation scripts without warning about system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The missing-CLI fallback instructs the agent to install software without explicitly obtaining approval for executing downloaded code or changing the local environment. Restricting this to a command-not-found error reduces exposure, but a read-only Celigo request does not itself authorize software installation; the declared Bash allowlist may constrain execution but does not make the guidance safe.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources