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Security audit

Callingly

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The Callingly operations have clear approval controls, but setup directs the agent to execute downloaded installers without separate approval or integrity verification.

Review and approve CLI installation separately, preferably using a verified release. Review its automatic skill synchronization before running it. OOMOL mediates Callingly requests and credentials; retain the exact-payload and deletion approval requirements. The remote installers were unavailable for inspection.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied command performs no visible Callingly operation. Its sole behavior is executing an installer hosted by Oomol. Although dependency installation can be a supporting implementation detail, the supplied content establishes no relationship between this installer and the declared Callingly functionality. The downloaded script's further effects cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The curl-to-bash command immediately executes a mutable remote script without a pinned version or independently verified integrity; the PowerShell alternative follows the same pattern. Although OOMOL is a relevant dependency and HTTPS protects transport, compromise of the distribution endpoint could yield arbitrary execution with the agent's local permissions, exposing accessible files and credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

First-time setup instructs the agent to execute downloaded installation scripts without warning the user about local system changes.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

When the CLI is missing, the skill directs the agent to install it without requiring approval for executing downloaded code or modifying the local environment. The confirmation requirements cover Callingly state changes, not local installation, so a routine service request could trigger consequential actions beyond the user's intended scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources