T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:57- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Scripts Executed Directly
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 57–61
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalThe first-time setup instructions execute mutable remote content directly in Bash or PowerShell:
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
Both installation commands retrieve executable content from
cli.oomol.comand pass it immediately to a command interpreter. They do not pin an installer version, validate a cryptographic checksum, verify a digital signature, or provide an opportunity to inspect the downloaded script.Although the hostname is consistent with the declared OOMOL provider, the effective code is not included in the audited project and may change after review. Compromise of the hosting service, release process, domain, DNS resolution, or TLS trust chain could therefore turn these commands into arbitrary code-execution channels.
Installing a required CLI may be a legitimate setup operation, but arbitrary shell execution exceeds the minimum privileges needed for the Skill's declared read-only Calendarific functionality. The Skill only needs to query schemas and retrieve holiday, country, and language information. It should not automatically introduce unrestricted execution of unaudited remote code.
The Bash pipeline also lacks an independent integrity check for the installer artifact. Likewise, PowerShell's
Invoke-Expressionexecutes the retrieved response as code without validating its origin beyond ordinary HTTPS transport.Attack Path
- The user or agent attempts to use the Skill on a system where the
ooCLI is unavailable. - The first-time setup instructions direct the user to run one of the remote installation commands.
- An attacker compromises or gains influence over the instal ...[truncated 1349 chars]
- The user or agent attempts to use the Skill on a system where the
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove direct
curl | bashandInvoke-Expressioninstallation instructions. - Distribute the CLI through a reputable platform package manager or a signed, versioned release artifact.
- Pin an exact CLI and installer version rather than retrieving a mutable installation endpoint.
- Download the installer to a local file without executing it immediately.
- Publish and verify a SHA-256 or stronger cryptographic digest over the downloaded artifact.
- Verify a vendor-controlled digital signature whose trusted public key is distributed independently of the download host.
- Display the artifact path and verification result before execution, allowing review and explicit user approval.
- Require informed user confirmation before performing any installation; the agent should never install the CLI automatically following a failed command.
- Prefer a least-privilege installation that does not require administrator or root access.
- Document the files, permissions, subprocesses, and network destinations used by the installer.
- Where practical, include the installer source in an auditable, version-pinned package rather than executing code whose contents can change after Skill review.
A safer conceptual workflow is:
bash curl -fL -o oo-installer.sh "https://trusted.example/releases/VERSION/install.sh" echo "EXPECTED_SHA256 oo-installer.sh" | sha256sum --check - # Review the downloaded file and obtain explicit user approval before execution. bash oo-installer.shThe actual implementation should use an official versioned OOMOL artifact and a digest or signature published through an independently trusted channel.
- Remove direct
