Security audit

BTCPay Server

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s BTCPay Server actions are coherent, but its first-time setup tells users to run an unverified internet installer directly in a shell.

Review the install step carefully before using this skill. Prefer installing the oo CLI from verified official releases or package-manager instructions with checksums/signatures, and confirm every BTCPay write action payload before it runs.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error

Location: SKILL.md:61
Finding: Unverified Remote Installer Downloaded and Executed Directly
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation
oo-installer.sh" | sha256sum --check - less oo-installer.sh bash oo-installer.sh ``` The actual URL, version, and checksum must come from a trusted official release process; placeholders must not be used operationally. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

External Script Fetching

High

Category: Supply Chain
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The skill instructs the agent/user to install software by piping a remotely fetched script directly into a shell, which is a well-known supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk. If the install endpoint, transport, distribution pipeline, or upstream publisher is compromised, arbitrary code would execute immediately on the host with the user's privileges.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

oo: command not found — install the oo CLI (other platforms: https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md):

bash
curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux

powershell

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.