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Security audit

BT Panel MCP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Server changes require approval, but setup directs the agent to run an unverified online installer without a separate approval step.

Review and approve CLI installation separately, using a pinned and independently verified source. Check whether installation adds or updates other agent skills. Limit the connected BT Panel account's permissions and confirm each server-changing operation. The downloaded installers and live connector implementation were not verified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied code executes an OOMOL-hosted installation script rather than performing BT Panel MCP operations. No connection to the declared functionality is shown, so this is not established as a supporting implementation detail. The downloaded script's contents and subsequent effects cannot be determined from this chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a live HTTPS response directly into bash executes whatever the installation endpoint serves, without version pinning or independent integrity verification. A compromised distribution endpoint could execute arbitrary commands with the agent's local privileges, exposing accessible credentials and files; the Windows installation command has the same underlying weakness.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

First-time setup instructs the agent to execute downloaded installation scripts without warning about local system changes or remote-code execution.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The setup instructions direct the agent to execute remote installation scripts without first explaining local changes or obtaining explicit installation approval. Although setup only occurs when the CLI is missing, permission to manage BT Panel data does not necessarily authorize installing software and running remote code on the local machine.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources