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Security audit

BigCommerce

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This BigCommerce skill is coherent, but its setup tells agents to run unverified remote installer scripts on the user’s machine.

Review the setup path before installing. Prefer installing the oo CLI through a trusted, verifiable package or by downloading and checking the installer before execution, and only approve BigCommerce create, update, or delete actions after reviewing the exact target and payload.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:59
Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 59–63 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linux ``` ```powershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShell ``` ### Technical Analysis The first-time setup instructions retrieve mutable scripts from an external URL and immediately execute them through Bash or PowerShell. Neither installation path pins a specific artifact version, verifies a cryptographic checksum or publisher signature, nor gives the user an opportunity to inspect the downloaded script before execution. HTTPS protects the network connection but does not establish that every future version of the remotely hosted script is safe. The effective executable payload can change after this Skill has been reviewed. Compromise of the hosting infrastructure, publication process, domain, DNS resolution, or applicable TLS trust chain could therefore turn the documented installation commands into an arbitrary-code execution channel. Installing the `oo` CLI supports the declared BigCommerce connector functionality, but immediate execution of an unverified remote script exceeds the minimum necessary installation behavior. A pinned and cryptographically verified release artifact would provide the required functionality with lower supply-chain risk. ### Attack Path 1. The user or agent attempts a BigCommerce action and receives an `oo: command not found` error. 2. The agent follows the first-time setup instructions in `SKILL.md`. 3. An attacker compromises or gains control over the remote installer delivery or publication path. 4. The attacker replaces the installer response with malicious shell or PowerShell commands. 5. `curl | bash` or `irm | iex` executes the response immediately without integrity verification. 6. The malicious c ...[truncated 1057 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the direct `curl | bash` and `irm | iex` execution pipelines. 2. Prefer an authenticated operating-system package manager or an official, versioned release package. 3. Pin the CLI to a reviewed version and use an immutable or version-specific artifact URL. 4. Download the artifact to disk without executing it automatically. 5. Verify a publisher signature or compare a SHA-256 digest against a trusted, independently distributed value before execution. 6. Present the resolved version, source, checksum, and intended installation changes to the user and obtain explicit approval before running the installer. 7. Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a specific operation demonstrably requires elevation. 8. Document how users can inspect the installer and verify its provenance manually. 9. Consider making CLI installation an administrator-controlled prerequisite rather than an action performed by the Skill.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
- **`oo: command not found`** — install the oo CLI (other platforms: <https://cli.oomol.com/install-guide.md>):

  ```bash
  curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash    # macOS / Linux
  ```

  ```powershell
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill recommends installing software via `curl ... | bash`, which executes a remote script directly in the shell without prior verification. If the remote host, transport, installer, or distribution path is compromised, this can lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The description says to use this skill for "ANY BigCommerce request" and "Whenever a task involves BigCommerce," which is extremely broad and could match a wide range of ordinary requests without clear scope boundaries. The file does not provide limiting conditions, exclusions, or negative examples to clarify when the skill should not activate.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.