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Security audit

Anymail Finder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The email lookup workflow fits its purpose, but setup can execute unchecked remote code and introduce persistent changes to other agent skills.

Review and verify the CLI installation before allowing the fallback commands. Contain its persistent skill changes: upstream documents OO_SKILLS_SYNC_DISABLED=1 for disabling startup synchronization. [CLI controls](https://github.com/oomol-lab/oo-cli/blob/main/docs/commands.md). Submit only lookup details you authorize sharing with OOMOL and Anymail Finder, and consider available credits. The remote installers and live connector implementation remain unverified; no malicious intent was established.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The supplied command contains no Anymail Finder interaction and instead executes an installer hosted on an unrelated domain. Nothing supplied establishes this installation as a supporting dependency for the declared purpose. The downloaded script's contents are unavailable, so its further behavior cannot be determined.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The supplied code performs only authentication, not Anymail Finder searches or data retrieval. Authentication could be a supporting implementation detail, but nothing in this chunk connects the oo login to Anymail Finder or establishes it as a prerequisite for the declared functionality.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The setup command pipes a remotely fetched, unpinned script directly into Bash without an independent integrity check or review; the PowerShell alternative has the same execution pattern. If the distribution endpoint or release infrastructure is compromised, an agent following this fallback could execute attacker-controlled code with its process privileges, exposing local files and credentials. Its conditional setup context reduces exposure but does not remove the supply-chain risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

The action workflow lacks a privacy warning about transmitting personal lookup data to external services.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit action payloads through OOMOL to Anymail Finder; the supported actions include searches using a person's name, company, LinkedIn profile, or email address (lines 40–44). Although the connector is identified, the skill does not warn that these personal details leave the user's environment, and line 48 broadly labels untagged actions safe to run directly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — OOMOL billing stop. Recharge at `https://console.oomol.com/billing/token-recharge` before retrying.

- **HTTP 402 without `OOMOL_INSUFFICIENT_CREDIT`** — the third-party account itself has no active plan or credit. Report the provider error message as is; do not ask the user to recharge OOMOL.

## Resources