T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:56- Finding
Unverified Remote Installer Download and Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 56–62
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash curl -fsSL https://cli.oomol.com/install.sh | bash # macOS / Linuxpowershell irm https://cli.oomol.com/install.ps1 | iex # Windows PowerShellTechnical Analysis
The first-time setup instructions download mutable scripts from an external server and pass them directly to Bash or PowerShell. The commands do not pin an installer version, validate a cryptographic signature or checksum, or allow inspection before execution.
The source domain is consistent with the declared OOMOL service, but this does not eliminate the security risk. The effective installer payload can change after the Skill has been audited. Compromise of the hosting service, publishing credentials, DNS/TLS path, or release pipeline could therefore convert these setup commands into arbitrary local code execution.
Installing the CLI may be relevant to the Skill's operation, but immediate execution of unverified remote content exceeds the minimum privilege and trust required to distribute it. A verified, version-pinned installation mechanism would provide the needed functionality with substantially less risk.
Attack Path
- The
ooCLI is unavailable, and an attempted connector command returnsoo: command not found. - The Agent or user follows the documented first-time setup instructions.
- An attacker has compromised the external installer, its publishing pipeline, hosting infrastructure, or relevant delivery path.
curlor PowerShell retrieves the attacker-controlled response.- The shell immediately executes the response without integrity or authenticity verification.
- The payload runs with the privileges of the invoking account and can perform any operation available to that account.
Impact Assessment
Successful expl ...[truncated 942 chars]
- The
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Do not pipe downloaded content directly into an interpreter.
-
Distribute the CLI through a trusted package manager or a versioned official release artifact.
-
Pin the exact installer or CLI version rather than retrieving a mutable latest script.
-
Download the artifact to a local file before execution.
-
Verify a vendor-provided cryptographic signature and a checksum obtained through an independently authenticated channel.
-
Fail closed if signature, checksum, expected publisher, or version verification fails.
-
Present the source, version, destination, and expected effects to the user and require explicit approval before installation.
-
Run installation with ordinary user privileges unless a documented operation strictly requires elevation.
-
Publish reproducible installer source and retain immutable release artifacts so the reviewed payload can be matched to the executed payload.
-
Replace the current examples with a workflow equivalent to:
bash curl -fLo oo-installer.sh \ https://cli.oomol.com/releases/<pinned-version>/install.sh echo '<trusted-sha256> oo-installer.sh' | sha256sum -c - less oo-installer.sh bash oo-installer.shA detached-signature verification workflow is preferable to relying solely on a checksum when practical.
-
