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Security audit

Awesome Remote Control

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill openly launches remotely controllable Claude sessions with safety prompts disabled, but it also persists workspace trust and contains an unsafe resume path that warrants Review.

Install only if you deliberately want remote Claude Code sessions that can run without normal permission prompts. Treat the session URL like a secret, avoid using this on untrusted repositories or sensitive home-directory workspaces, prefer a sandboxed account/container, and do not pass resume UUIDs from untrusted text until the command construction is fixed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/start_session.sh:135
Finding

Command Injection Through an Unvalidated Resume UUID

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/start_session.sh:55
Finding

Remote Agent Is Launched With Workspace Trust and Permission Safeguards Disabled

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (17)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill is framed as starting sessions but also allows sending tasks into already-running remote sessions and inspecting tmux state. That broadens it from setup automation into active control of existing agent sessions, creating risk of unintended command injection into privileged contexts or manipulation of sessions the user did not mean to target.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill is framed as starting sessions but also allows sending tasks into already-running remote sessions and inspecting tmux state. That broadens it from setup automation into active control of existing agent sessions, creating risk of unintended command injection into privileged contexts or manipulation of sessions the user did not mean to target.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill is framed as starting sessions but also allows sending tasks into already-running remote sessions and inspecting tmux state. That broadens it from setup automation into active control of existing agent sessions, creating risk of unintended command injection into privileged contexts or manipulation of sessions the user did not mean to target.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill is framed as starting sessions but also allows sending tasks into already-running remote sessions and inspecting tmux state. That broadens it from setup automation into active control of existing agent sessions, creating risk of unintended command injection into privileged contexts or manipulation of sessions the user did not mean to target.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill is framed as starting sessions but also allows sending tasks into already-running remote sessions and inspecting tmux state. That broadens it from setup automation into active control of existing agent sessions, creating risk of unintended command injection into privileged contexts or manipulation of sessions the user did not mean to target.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly launches Claude Code with --dangerously-skip-permissions --remote-control but does not foreground a strong safety warning. This creates a severe risk because it enables a remotely controllable agent session without normal permission prompts, substantially weakening user oversight and making subsequent file or shell actions far more dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

cmd_trust_workspace silently marks a workspace as trusted by setting hasTrustDialogAccepted=True in the user's Claude config. That bypasses a security-relevant consent mechanism and is especially dangerous in the context of a remote-control session starter, where untrusted projects could gain elevated automation without the user's informed approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script is explicitly designed to start Claude with --dangerously-skip-permissions and --remote-control, disabling normal approval barriers for a remotely driven agent. In a remote-session skill, this greatly increases risk because any prompt injection, malicious repository content, or operator mistake can lead to unrestricted tool execution or sensitive data access without interactive consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/start_session.sh (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

sh
read -r SESSION_LABEL
  read -r TMUX_NAME
} < "$STATE_DIR/.name_$$"
rm -f "$STATE_DIR/.name_$$"

echo "Starting session: $SESSION_LABEL  (tmux: $TMUX_NAME)"

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill clearly instructs use of shell commands, tmux, and persistent file reads/writes, yet declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In a skill whose purpose is to launch remote-control sessions with bypassed permissions, missing scope declarations increases the chance of overbroad execution and unsafe invocation without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The invocation language is very broad ('use when asked to start a remote session... or any variation'), which increases the chance the skill is auto-selected in contexts where the user did not intend remote control or permission bypass. In a high-risk skill, broad triggers are dangerous because they reduce specificity around consent for launching privileged remote sessions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to always return the remote-control session URL to the user but does not warn that the URL is effectively an access handle to a live remote session. Exposing and normalizing that URL without privacy guidance increases the chance of accidental disclosure through logs, chat history, screenshots, or forwarding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/registry.py (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

python
python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/registry.py" <command> [args...]

Commands:
    ensure-dir                          Create state dir with safe permissions
    add <name> <url> <dir> [uuid]       Register a new active session
    mark-dead <name>                    Mark a session dead + capture UUID
    prune [days]                        Remove dead entries older than N days (default 30)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The helper explicitly includes functionality to alter ~/.claude.json and pre-seed workspace trust, which exceeds simple session tracking. In a remote-control skill whose metadata already mentions bypass permissions, this expands the tool's authority and can suppress a meaningful user safety check for arbitrary workspaces.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/registry.py (reported line 188)May include surrounding context.

python
tmux_name = "".join(c for c in tmux_name if c.isalnum() or c == "-")

        tmux_alive = (
            subprocess.run(
                ["tmux", "has-session", "-t", tmux_name], capture_output=True
            ).returncode
            == 0

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The trust-setting behavior occurs without a clear user-facing warning in this function, so users may not realize a persistent security preference is being changed. Hidden persistence of trust weakens informed consent and can make later execution in that workspace less scrutinized.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script automatically marks the provided working directory as trusted before launching the remote-controlled Claude session, with no confirmation or visibility to the user. In this skill’s context, that is dangerous because the session is also started in remote-control mode with permission checks bypassed, so untrusted project contents may immediately influence a highly privileged agent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.