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Security audit

Agent Browser

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent browser automation skill, but it needs Review because it normalizes persistent authenticated browser state and mutable global installation without enough safety guidance.

Install only if you trust the agent-browser package/source you are installing, prefer pinned versions or audited commits, avoid running installation with elevated privileges, and treat auth.json, screenshots, PDFs, videos, traces, cookies, storage, and network logs as sensitive secrets that should not be committed or shared and should be deleted when no longer needed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package and Source Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
``` 2. Record and verify npm integrity metadata or package provenance before installation. 3. Pin source installations to an audited commit: ```bash git clone https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser cd agent-browser git checkout --detach ``` 4. Require signature verification for signed releases or tags where upstream supports it. 5. Commit and review a dependency lockfile, then require a frozen installation mode such as: ```bash pnpm install --frozen-lockfile ``` 6. Publish expected cryptographic checksums for browser binaries and other downloaded artifacts, and verify them before execution. 7. Prefer a local, isolated installation or sandbox over a global package installation. 8. Warn users not to run installation as root or with administrative privileges unless strictly necessary. Review system dependencies before using `--with-deps`. 9. Establish a controlled update process in which package versions, source commits, lockfiles, and downloaded artifacts are re-audited before documentation is updated. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CONTRIBUTING.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
## Adding New Commands to the Skill

Update SKILL.md when the upstream CLI adds new commands.
- Keep the Installation section
- Add new commands in the correct category
- Include usage examples

Context Window Stuffing

Medium
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser open # Navigate to page agent-browser snapshot -i # Get interactive elements with refs agent-browser click @e1 # Click element by ref agent-browser fill @e2 "text" # Fill input by ref agent-browser close # Close browser

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documents saving screenshots, PDFs, videos, traces, and session artifacts but does not warn that these outputs can capture sensitive page contents, authenticated views, tokens in URLs, or reusable browser/session material. In an agent context, users may run these commands against internal or logged-in applications, causing confidential data to be written to disk or shared downstream without realizing the exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The authentication and saved-state examples normalize writing session state to a file without warning that such files may contain reusable authenticated session material. If an agent or user stores or transfers auth.json insecurely, another party could replay the session and gain unauthorized access to the target application.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The documented ability to save and later load browser session state enables persistence of authenticated sessions across runs. Without guardrails or warnings, this can facilitate credential/session reuse, accidental long-term retention of access, and compromise if the state file is exposed to other users, agents, or processes.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 236)May include surrounding context.

bash
agent-browser state save auth.json    # Save session state
agent-browser state load auth.json    # Load saved state

Example: Form submission

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The example explicitly encourages loading previously saved authenticated state in later sessions, which increases the chance that reusable session material will be retained and replayed. In the context of an automation skill for agents, this is particularly dangerous because agents may handle multiple tasks, users, or environments and could unintentionally apply persisted auth to the wrong workflow or leak it via shared storage.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

agent-browser wait --url "/dashboard" agent-browser state save auth.json

Later sessions: load saved state

agent-browser state load auth.json agent-browser open https://app.example.com/dashboard

text

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The natural-language description at L03 is Chinese-only, while the rest of the manifest includes English triggers and does not state that the skill is intended exclusively for Chinese-speaking users or a region-specific context. This can amount to a language-policy issue because it imposes a locale on users without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad phrases such as 'browser automation', 'web scraping', and generic browsing terms that can match many unrelated user requests. In an agent environment, this can cause the skill to activate outside its narrow intended scope, increasing the chance of unintended web actions, data access, or overlap with safer/more specific skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.