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Security audit

cron-callback-session

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill openly implements session callback and message injection, but it asks users to broaden session routing and optionally cross-agent routing in ways that need careful review before installation.

Install only if you deliberately need cron or external jobs to send results back into an existing OpenClaw/QClaw session. Prefer keeping visibility at tree when possible, avoid visibility=all and wildcard agent-to-agent rules, limit targets to explicit sessions, run gateway restarts only during a maintenance window, and restore the default routing setting after use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding

Overly Broad Cross-Session Message Injection Permissions

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:212
Finding

Wildcard Cross-Agent Injection Configuration

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:110
Finding

Unsafe Force-Termination and Manual Gateway Restart Procedure

Content
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, -Force Start-Sleep -Seconds 3 Start-Process -FilePath $node ` -ArgumentList "--title=openclaw-gateway","--no-warnings","--max-semi-space-size=128","--max-old-space-size=4096",$mjs,"gateway","run","--port","$port" ` -WindowStyle Hidden ` -PassThru ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented restart procedure force-terminates gateway processes and manually launches a hidden replacement. The process-discovery condition relies primarily on an executable name and command-line substring. It does not verify the executable path, process owner, service identity, parent process, expected installation directory, or cryptographic identity before termination. Force termination can interrupt every active session, cron task, and operation handled by the gateway. If the selected process identifiers are stale or incorrectly chosen, an unrelated process may be terminated. If the replacement executable path, module path, port, or arguments are incorrect, the gateway may not recover. Launching the replacement with a hidden window also reduces immediate visibility into startup failures. The documentation contains explicit warnings and manual verification steps, which reduce accidental misuse, but the procedure still relies on fragile manual process handling rather than an atomic service-management operation. ### Attack Path 1. An operator or Agent follows the documented restart instructions. 2. Process selection matches one or more `node.exe` processes containing the expected command-line substring. 3. The process identifiers are copied manually without validating ow ...[truncated 971 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Ssd 4

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This section lays out a complete procedure for weakening session isolation (visibility=agent), restarting the gateway so the weaker policy takes effect, and then using that access to inject messages across sessions. That is dangerous because it normalizes privilege broadening and operationalizes cross-session command delivery, undermining isolation guarantees that would otherwise block unauthorized or unintended message routing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The cron payload instructs an isolated session to send a crafted message into a target session while suppressing normal message/output behavior, which creates a covert indirect injection chain. This is dangerous because it enables hidden or hard-to-audit inter-session control flow where an external scheduler can trigger actions inside another conversation with its full context, potentially causing unauthorized task execution or confusing provenance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill when the user asks phrases like '定时任务完成后回到本对话继续推进' or '让任务结果上报到同一对话', but it does not clearly delimit whether this applies only to cron/OpenClaw session-injection workflows or to any request about continuing work in the same conversation. Without exclusions or negative examples, these trigger descriptions are broad enough to overlap with ordinary task-continuation requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly documents how to expand from same-session callbacks into cross-agent message injection by enabling broader visibility and agent-to-agent routing. This turns a narrowly scoped callback mechanism into a general lateral-messaging capability that can be abused to inject instructions into unrelated agents or sessions, increasing the blast radius well beyond the stated use case.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The top-level description emphasizes using cron, external processes, or another session to inject into a target session so the original conversation continues, especially when a task should report back to the same dialogue. L021-L024 extends this into general-purpose external triggering and monitoring/watchdog alerts that wake agents on anomalies, which goes beyond the narrower callback/session-resume framing in the manifest.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.